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the Estate of Edward 
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vs. 
EDWARD K. FRANCIS, SR., and 
PATRICIA BLUNDON FRANCIS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 1 
Court of Appeals No. 970651-CA 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Priority No. 15 
Summary of Argument and Standard of Review 
There are five issues on appeal: 
1. Was any behavior by Defendants preceding or following the 
suicide of their son sufficiently outrageous to support an 
award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
2. Was any behavior on the part of the Defendants done 
intentionally and for the purpose of causing harm to 
Plaintiff or the proximate cause Plaintiff's severe 
emotional distress. 
3. Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent 
evidence of fair market value. 
|L 
4. Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent 
evidence of a demand for the return of the allegedly 
converted property? 
5. Were the trial court's findings of fact relative to the 
values of the allegedly converted property clearly 
erroneous? 
As to the issues which are mixed questions of law and fact, 
subordinate findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard while the ultimate conclusions as well as the 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). Challenges to the findings of 
fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Alta 
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
In challenging facts, the Appellant must marshal the 
evidence, assembling the facts in support of the judgment, and 
then, in light of such facts, demonstrate that there is some 
fatal flaw in the evidence. Oneida/SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage 
and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In the present case, the evidence has been marshaled. It is set 
forth in the Opening Brief in fastitious and exhaustive detail. 
Plaintiff concedes as much. Plaintiff's/Appellee's Brief 2. 
The evidence adduced in this case has several fatal flaws. 
There is no evidence of causation or intent to harm or purpose to 
inflict emotional distress by Plaintiffs. There was a complete 
2 
failure of evidence on this point and the trial court's decision 
is devoid of any reference to these points. Similarly, a review 
of the evidence fails to disclose single act by Defendants, or a 
any series of acts by Defendants, which can reasonably be called 
extreme or outrageous. There was a failure of proof of fair 
market value of the property Plaintiff claims was converted; 
instead, the only evidence of value was her uninformed, 
unsupported opinion. Finally, there was no evidence that any 
demand was made, which is a necessary prerequisite to suit for 
conversion in a case such as this. Accordingly, the judgment 
should be reversed. 
Reply Argument 
I. Judgment Should be Reversed As There was a Complete Failure 
of Proof of Causation 
Proof of proximate causation is essential to Plaintiff's 
claim. She has failed in this proof. A review of the judge's 
decision, which includes the judge's determinations of fact, 
fails to reveal any finding of causation.1 The evidence is clear 
1. At several points in her brief, Plaintiff confuses the 
particular issue at hand by discussing her emotional distress 
rather than causation or intent. Appellee's Brief 9-10, 12. 
Causation, intent, and severe emotional distress are each 
distinct elements and proof of one does not excuse proof of any 
other. 
It should be noted that there has never been any dispute 
that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. She clearly 
did. The fact has always been that Defendant did not act 
intentionally to cause her distress or in any way outrageously. 
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that the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff's emotional 
distress was finding her deceased husband's body. 
Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, M 20-22. 
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." 
Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In 
the present case, the natural cause, the caused which produced 
Plaintiff's injury was the suicide of her husband and her own 
guilt over precipitating that tragedy. 
The medical records, which Plaintiff introduced, amply 
demonstrate that it was finding Little Ed's body and the 
associated trauma with his suicide was the cause of her distress. 
Plaintiff now attempts to point to other events —events not 
considered by the trial court— to bolster her non-existant proof 
of causation. She now claims that she was "assaulted" on 16 
March 1994 and that such "assault" caused her to be 
hospitalized.2 Curiously, she did not assert any claim for 
Plaintiff herself concedes that at most, Defendants' acts were 
only a cause (i.e., one of several) of distress not the sole 
cause. Appellee's Brief 11 (emphasis added). Conceding this 
point heightens the need for specific evidence of causation. 
Having failed to adduce such evidence, the judgment cannot stand. 
2. Plaintiff claims she was briefly hospitalized by her 
obstetrician on the day of this confrontation, 16 March 1995. 
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assault in her complaint nor did the trial court make any such 
finding nor even a reference to such an altercation. 
The only statement of the trial court which could reasonably 
be considered as even close to a finding of causation is the bald 
and unsupported statement that "Plaintiff suffered emotional 
distress at the hands of the defendants," Trial Court Decision 
15. This statement appears in the court's "analysis" section 
rather than the section the court entitled "facts." Even if this 
conclusory statement is viewed as a finding of fact, rather than 
part of the trial court's analysis, there are no subsidiary facts 
found which lend the necessary factual support and the court made 
no such factual finding. The reason is simple: there are no 
facts which could lead a reasonable finder of fact, properly 
focused on the issue of causation, to conclude that the 
Defendants caused Plaintiff7s emotional distress. 
"'Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
Trial Transcript 78. She makes this claim repeatedly in her 
appellate brief. Appellee's Brief 4-5, 8-9, 11, 12. However a 
review of Plaintiff's medical records, which were introduced as 
exhibits at trial reveals no such hospitalization. To the 
contrary, there is a billing record only for 14 March 1994 for 
some miscellaneous lab work. See Trial Exhibit 10, attached 
hereto as Appendix A. This admission followed an admission in 
February and preceded the admission on 18 March 1994, when she 
found her husband. Plaintiff's testimony is belied by her own 
medical records; there was no hospitalization or admission on 16 
March 1994. 
5 
reached."'" Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-39 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), quoting. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), quoting Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). In this case, there are no such findings on the 
critical issue of outrageousness. 
The Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress when she 
found her dead husband, not before. Defendants'/Appellants' 
Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, 11 20-22. In addition, 
Plaintiff fails to recognize her own role in these sorrowful 
events. She told the Decedent that her unborn child was not his. 
She testified that her purpose in so doing was to upset Little 
Ed. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement of Facts 1 
9. Her own psychologist testified that such a statement could be 
extremely upsetting to Little Ed. Ld. 1 35. Most importantly, 
Plaintiff's own medical records demonstrate that she herself 
believed she played a role in this tragedy: "The client is 
blaming herself for the suicide stating that she and her husband 
had separated 36 hours earlier." id. SI 33. 
There was a complete failure of proof that Defendants caused 
Plaintiff's severe emotional distress. The trial court made no 
such finding and the Defendant has pointed to no evidence in the 
record which demontrates that Defendants were the natural cause 
of Plaintiff's suffering. There is none to be found in this case. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
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II. Judgment Ought To Be Reversed As There Was No Evidence of 
Intent to Harm 
It is also necessary, in order to sustain a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, to prove intent. 
There was a total failure of evidence on this point as well. 
Like causation, the trial court failed to make any findings, 
ultimate or subordinate, that any actions of the Defendant were 
for the intent of causing Plaintiff any kind of distress 
whatsoever. 
The uniform, and oft-cited rule, is that Defendants must 
have acted intentionally and with the purpose of causing severe 
emotional distress to Plaintiff. Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 
687-88 (Utah 1996); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 
896, 905 (Utah 1992); Larsen v. Svsco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 560 
(Utah 1989); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961). 
This formulation, imposes a dual intent requirement: First, the 
actor must act intentionally or with recklessness in taking 
action. Put another way, the actor must act with volition 
intending the act and the consequences of the act or with 
reckless disregard for the foreseeable results of the actions. 
Second, the actor must take such intentional or reckless act with 
the purpose in mind of causing emotional distress to the 
plaintiff. Id. 
Thus, Plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to convince 
a finder of fact that Defendants acted intentionally and with the 
7 
purpose of causing her distress. In the present case, there is 
not a single piece of evidence, nor a single finding of fact of a 
general or specific nature, which would support a finding that 
Defendants ever took any action for the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress upon Plaintiff. 
The facts, as pointed out in the opening brief, demonstrate 
the precise moment Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress: 
when she found her husband's body. Defendants'/Appellants' 
Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, M 20-22. She called 
Defendants, in accordance with Little Ed's suicide note and was 
whisked off to the hospital before the Defendants arrived. Id. 
Every subsequent hospitalization noted that it was this event 
which was the cause of her distress.3 Id. See also, 
3. The Restatement of Torts contains an illustration 
somewhat similar to this case: 
During A's absence from her home, B attempts to commit 
suicide in A's kitchen by cutting his throat. B knows 
that A is substantially certain to return and find his 
body, and to suffer emotional distress. A finds B 
lying in her kitchen in a pool of gore, and suffers 
severe emotional distress. B is subject to liability 
to A. 
RESTATEMENT, 2D, TORTS § 46, ill. 15. In the present case, then, 
Plaintiff may have had a cause of action against her husband. 
This serves to illustrate, however, Plaintiff's own role in 
this tragedy. On 16 March 1995, Plaintiff publically shouted at 
Little Ed, a mildly physically disabled person, that her child 
was not his. This comment, coming on the heals of their decision 
to divorce, was taken hard and likely played a significant role 
in Little Ed's decision to commit suicide. 
Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement of Facts f 35. 
Plaintiff herself testified that her purpose in making this 
sordid comment was to upset Little Ed. Xd. 1 9. 
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Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Appendix D (Plaintiff's 
hospital records). 
In response to this, Plaintiff weakly asserts —without 
factual or legal underpinning— that "[i]t would be ludicrous to 
believe that they did not intend to harm plaintiff." 
Plaintiff's/Appellee's Brief 13. In order to prevail, Plaintiff 
was required to provide evidence more substantial than her 
evanescent conjecture that the actions of the Defendant were 
undertaken for the purpose of inflicting harm on her. This 
evidence should have been embodied in the trial court's formal 
findings. Neither was done. 
In the portion of the trial court's ruling setting forth the 
facts, there is no fact which relates to intent or purpose or 
which could reasonably sustain such a finding. Equally 
important, Plaintiff points to no evidence, no testimony, no 
proof to attempt to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the failure 
to address the issue in the decision, the trial court 
nevertheless had such evidence before it. She points to none 
because there is none. 
This is not a case in which the Appellee claims that the 
evidence has not been properly marshaled. To the contrary, she 
concedes that the Appellant's statement of facts was detailed and 
indicated her general agreement. Having ferreted out the facts, 
there is simply no evidence of Defendants intent or purpose. 
Given the total failure of proof on this point, the trial court's 
9 
award of damages cannot be sustained. Intent and purpose to 
inflict emotional harm are fundamental elements of the tort; 
absent these elements, no tort has been committed and Defendants 
are not subject to liability to Plaintiff. There being no such 
evidence, the trial court's award of damages for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress must be reversed. 
Ill. Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Absent a Determinatin of 
Outrageousness 
Thedegree of "outrageousness" required before an act is 
sufficient to sustain a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is measured objectively. 
Retherford v. AT&T, 842 P.2d 949, 976 n.17 (Utah 1992). As noted 
in the opening brief, only atrocious, extraordinarily vile 
conduct satisfies this standard. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening 
Brief 26-27. In this case, that objective standard cannot fairly 
be said to have been met. 
The trial court appears to have decided that Defendants did 
three things which were extreme and outrageous. First, they 
"excluded plaintiff from the planning and execution of the 
funeral." Second, "they took control of her property and did 
with it as they pleased." Third, "they denied her any 
recognition as the decedent's spouse." Trial Court's Decision 
15. Under the rather extreme circumstances of this case, none of 
these items rises to the level of outrageousness required. These 
10 
conclusions are flawed for two reasons. the underlying facts do 
not support these ultimate conclusions and, taking these facts in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there has been no 
outrageous and extreme conduct. 
The trial court concluded that Defendant's excluded 
Plaintiff from planning and control of the funeral. The evidence 
is that, Defendants and their attorney spoke with Plaintiff about 
the funeral and gave her the opportunity to handle all of the 
arrangements for Little Ed's funeral, provided she paid for such 
arrangements. She rejected this proposal and gave Defendants 
permission to proceed with the funeral. It must be remembered 
that Plaintiff left the suicide scene before Defendants arrived 
and was admitted later that morning to the hospital in a nearly 
hysterical state. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, 
Statement of Facts 1 22. Plaintiff was not released from the 
hospital until after the funeral, id. There was absolutely no 
suggestion or evidence of any kind that the funeral was timed to 
prevent Plaintiff's attendance. These acts cannot be said to be 
outrageous. 
The trial court also wrote that Defendants took control of 
Plaintiff's property and did with it as they pleased. However 
Plaintiff and her parents took several car loads of property out 
of the house on 16 March 1995. Defendants'/ Appellants' Opening 
Brief, Statement of Facts SI 8. She had separated from Little Ed 
and they intended to divorce. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening 
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Brief, Statement of Facts M 11, 13. She had no further interest 
in the house. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement 
of Facts 1 4/ Trial Transcript 8-10 (Plaintiff's counsel formally 
relinquishes any interest in the home). Defendants may have made 
a poor legal judgment in assuming that their deceased son's 
estate would be theirs rather than his estranged wife. This may 
be legally incorrect, but it is neither extreme nor outrageous. 
It is also difficult to believe that Plaintiff was so severely 
emotionally distraught at being separated from the property that, 
even after retaining an attorney she never demanded the return of 
her property. This behavior is certainly not so utterly 
atrocious that no civilized society can tolerate it. Civilized 
society tolerates mistakes of judgement. 
Finally, the trial court concluded that Defendants denied 
Plaintiff recognition as the decedent's spouse. This apparently 
stems from the fact that she was not mentioned in the obituary in 
the Salina Sun or in the funeral program.4 Defendants had been 
4. The trial court entirely misunderstood and misstated the 
evidence relating to the obituaries. The first obituary was 
published in the Salina Sun under the direction of the funeral 
home director. It made no mention of the Plaintiff. She was 
upset when she discovered this, went to the director and 
prevailed upon him to correct this situation. 
Defendants'/Appellant's Opening Brief, Statement of Facts 1 24; 
Trial Transcript 94-95. 
The second obituary was prepared by Little Ed's sister, 
Teresa, who is not a party to this action. She prepared it about 
a month later and had it published in the Provo Herald to give 
Little Ed's friends in Payson notice of his death. Again, it 
made no notice of Plaintiff. However, the fact that the court 
ignored was that this notice was not published by the funeral 
12 
told by Little Ed that the marriage was over and that he and 
Plaintiff would divorce. There were very bitter feelings between 
them and Plaintiff. Defendant Ed Francis told the funeral 
director that Little Ed and Plaintiff were divorced. Under the 
circumstances, this is not outrageous and indeed, separating 
Plaintiff from Little Ed's family may have been a very good idea 
given the events of the prior week. There is no rule of 
compelled speech imposed by law or under threat of damages. This 
cannot constitute outrageous behavior. 
The first paragraph of Section 46, comment d of the 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, 2D, h a s o f t e n been r e c i t e d by Utah c o u r t s i n 
describing the nature of conduct necessary to constitute 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The second 
paragraph has not been cited, but is instructive: 
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, 
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppresions, or 
other trivialities. The rough edges of our society [or 
perhaps our nature] are still in need of a good deal of 
filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must 
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to 
a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional 
home director nor by the Defendants. The undisputed testimony 
—evidence not disputed by Plaintiff her brief before this court-
is that the Provo Herald notice was prepared and paid for by 
Little Ed's sister Teresa. The Defendants had no role, directly 
or indirectly, in that notice. Id. 
The trial court simply misunderstood this evidence. There 
was no other evidence on this point presented, so it was not a 
matter of believing some evidence and necessarily rejecting other 
evidence. The trial court was simply wrong. Trial Court's 
Decision M 31-32, at 7. Certainly, as a matter of law, it is 
not outrageous to play no role in the publication of the Provo 
Herald obituary. 
13 
acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. 
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every 
case where someone's feelings are hurt. There must 
still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, 
and some safety valve must be left through which 
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless 
steam. 
RESTATEMENT, 2D, TORTS § 46, cmt. d. P l a i n t i f f , Defendants , L i t t l e 
Ed, and Plaintiff's parents were all involved in an unseemly 
confrontation two days before Little Ed's suicide. Yelling, 
unkind words, physical altercations, breaking the furniture, 
police intervention, and allegations of adultery and lack of 
paternity and related implications of unmanliness were the order 
of the day.5 Liability does not extend to mere insults, 
indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppresions. 
Plaintiff has not suggested that Defendants have failed to 
marshal or otherwise place the facts supporting the judgment 
fairly before the Court. Upon reviewing the facts found by the 
trial court, outrage and resentment are not aroused, merely pity. 
Like Plaintiff's causation and intent failures, this point fails 
as well. Plaintiff lost her husband to a tragic suicide. She 
played a role in the events leading to this suicide. Defendants 
lost their youngest son to the same tragic suicide. There were 
neither findings nor evidence to support this point. The 
judgment should therefore be reversed. 
5. See footnote 2, supra. 
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IV. Absent Any Demand, There Could Be No Conversion 
Under many circumstances, a demand is required to complete a 
cause of action for conversion. This case presents such a 
circumstance. Plaintiff packed her things and left Little Ed two 
days prior to his suicide. She took several car and pick-up 
loads of material. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, 
Statement of Facts 11 8, 11, 13. Little Ed told his parents the 
marriage was over and that they would be divorcing. 
Little Ed shot himself on 18 March 1994. He was found by 
Plaintiff, who called Defendants. She had left the premises 
before Defendants arrived. She was then in the hospital for at 
least a week. After she was released, she went to the house and 
peered in the windows. Property was still there. She did 
nothing; she did not speak to Defendants. Defendants'/ 
Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement of Facts SIS! 19-22. 
Plaintiff had available legal processes to force the return 
of property to her as the personal representative of the estate. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-708 (1993).6 Given the circumstances 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-708 (1993) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by a decedentfs 
will, every personal representative has a right 
to, and shall take possession or control of, the 
decedent's property, except that any real property 
or tangible personal property may be left with or 
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled 
thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the 
personal representative, possession of the 
property by him will be necessary for purposes of 
administration. The request by a personal 
representative for delivery of any property 
15 
of this case, Plaintiff was under a duty to make some sort of 
demand of the Defendants for the return of property she claims 
was hers or the estate's. Conversion is not merely the wrongful 
possession of an item, it is the wrongful possession coupled with 
a denial of the owner's title. Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d 100, 
102 (Utah 1934). If there is never a demand, as Plaintiff 
concedes, there is never a denial of title and therefore, never a 
conversion. Accordingly, Defendants have not converted 
Plaintiff's property and the trial court's judgment was 
erroneous. It should be reversed. 
V. As the Only Evidence of Value Presented by Plaintiff Was Her 
Own Incompetant and Immaterial Opinion, She Cannot Recover 
Damages for Conversion 
Plaintiff also failed to satisfy her burden of proof of 
damages for conversion. Her evidence was entirely unsatisfactory 
and the court erred, as a matter of law and fact, in accepting it 
and basing an award of damages upon such evidence.7 
possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive 
evidence, in any action against the heir or 
devisee for possession thereof, that the 
possession of the property by the personal 
representative is necessary for purposes of 
administration. The personal representative shall 
pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably 
necessary for the management, protection, and 
preservation of, the estate in his possession. He 
may maintain an action to recover possession of 
property or to determine the title thereto. 
7. Plaintiff makes a very clever ploy to confuse the court 
and conflate her conversion claim and her intentional infliction 
16 
Plaintiff readily concedes that her evidence was based, in 
certain instances, upon the cost of the particular item and in 
other instances, upon her opinion as to value. Appellee's Brief 
15-16. Proof of market value, rather than cost or opinion of 
worth, is the proper measure of damages for conversion. 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993); 
Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1961). Without such 
evidence, a claim for conversion will not lie. Lowe at 421; Lym 
v. Tompson, 184 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1947). 
Citing to an ALR annotation, Plaintiff claims that in 
certain cases, court have accepted an alternative evidentiary 
means of assessing and proving value for converted goods. 
Plaintiff's Brief 13; Brendan de R. 0'Byrne, Annotation, 
Valuation of Wearing Apparel or Household Goods Kept By Owner for 
Personal Use, In Action for Loss or Conversion Of, or Injury To, 
Such Property, 34 A.L.R.3d 816 (1970). She claims that the 
courts will sustain a finding for her based upon proof of "value 
to the owner/' Id. at 13. Plaintiff cites the three Utah cases 
referred to in the ALR annotation in support of her claim: 
of emotional distress claim. She cites to several cases allowing 
damages for psychic disturbance in cases of wrongful eviction. 
Appellee's Brief 10. This is improper. She has never claimed to 
be entitled to psychic distress damages for a wrongful eviction 
and no such eviction has been claim or occurred. Plaintiff 
herself abandoned the premises in Sigurd and had no further 
interest in that home. Her counsel admitted this at the 
commencement of trial when he stipulated to an order, on his own 
motion, releasing the lis pendens on the house. Trial Transcript 
9-11. 
17 
Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1933); Pennington v.Redman 
Van & Storage Co., 97 P. 115 (Utah 1908); and Smith v. Mine & 
Smelter Supply Co., 88 P. 683 (Utah 1907). 
These cases discredit rather than sustain Plaintiff's 
position: 
Cost of an article, as indicated by the trial court, 
may be one way, or one of the factors that may be used 
in a proper case, of getting at the question of market 
value; but, standing alone, It Is not competent 
evidence. 
* * * 
As heretofore indicated, special cases an 
exceptional circumstances permit the allowance of a 
witness to testify s to the cost or price paid or 
reproduction value of the thing as a starting point} 
but, unless this is connected by some competent 
evidence that brings the cost or purchase price into 
relation with the market value except in certain cases 
of total loss or destruction of property, the evidence 
of cost or purchase price becomes incompetent and 
immaterial. 
Haycraft, 24 P.2d at 1112 (emphasis added). The Haycraft court 
then specifically discusses both Pennington and Smith. While 
purchase price or replacement price may be a starting point for 
assessing value, by itself it is insufficient, "incompetent and 
immaterial" in the words of Haycraft. Ld. There must be 
additional evidence tending to show the lack of a market, 
condition, age, and use. 
In the present case, there is no evidence as to any of these 
items. On items where a purchase price was stated, that was the 
full extent of the evidence offered. Trial Transcript, 176-216, 
250-76. No evidence of age, condition, marketability, or use was 
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ever offered. As to other items, Plaintiff offered her own 
unsubstantiated and useless opinion. id. There was no competent 
evidence of damages given. 
Plaintiff's argument on this point contains a paragraph that 
is both illustrative and fatuous. She writes: 
Ten guns were involved. Plaintiff expressed the 
opinion that the guns had a value of $400 each. Defendants 
contested this evidence. The court awarded $2,000 for the 
guns which would give them an average value of $200 each. 
The evidence indicated a value of $400 for at least two of 
the guns (a hand gun purchased by Mr. Francis from Little 
Ed, and a rifle sold to Juan Larsen). 
Appellee's Brief 15. The evidence presented was that the handgun 
purchase by Defendant Edward Francis for $400 occurred months 
before Little Ed's suicide. It was not one of the guns in the 
house at the time of his death. Defendants'/Appellants' Opening 
Brief 38 n.28. Indeed, Plaintiff herself recognized that the gun 
was sold. If it was sold to Defendants, how could it have 
possibly been converted by them months later? Similarly, the 
undisputed evidence was that the rifle sold to Juan Larsen was a 
rifle which belonged to the Defendants son-in-law, John Orr, 
which Defendant Ed Francis sold at his request. It never 
belonged in any sense to Little Ed. How was it converted? This 
portion of Plaintiff's argument is entirely disingenous, as 
demonstrated in Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief 38 n.28. 
Plaintiff's real point in these two pieces of evidence was 
not to establish particular items of converted property, but to 
try to lend some degree of credibility to her own preposterous 
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testimony regarding value. She claimed that it was well known 
that any gun has an average value of $400. As the foundation for 
this proposition, she indicated that she knew absolutely nothing 
about guns. She had never purchased one, sold one, or been 
present during a purchase.8 
The same quality of testimony continued for several other 
items of property. For example, even the trial court could not 
credit her testimony regarding a camera. See Decision 13-14; 
Trial Transcript 199-200. She claimed it was worth $2,500, but 
could provide no evidence as to model, make, type, or any other 
8. Plaintiff testified at trial, on cross-examination as 
follows: 
Q: [by Mr. Kunz] Do you know what guns they were? 
A: [by Plaintiff] I don't know nothing about guns, so I 
could not tell you. 
Q; An so you have —the only--how do you base then—if you 
don't know anything about guns, how do you base the 
value of $4,000 that you claim for the ten guns? 
A: xCause four thous--$400 is an average of how much you 
would pay for a gun. 
Q: So you're saying that you are just assuming then that--
that the ten guns had a value of $400 each; is that 
correct? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: But where do you get the $4 00? 
A: That is prob--an average tht you can get for a gun, a 
newer gun or any gun, that is how much you would pay to 
get a gun. 
Q: Have you ever bought a gun? 
A: No. I have not. 
Q: Have you ever sold a gun? 
A: No. I have not. 
Q: Have you ever been present when anybody bought a gun? 
A: Not that I can remember, no. 
Trial Transcript, 274-75. Given this testimony, it is difficult 
to understand the trial court's award of any damages for 
conversion of any gun. 
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pertinent information. Id. Her opinions of value range on items 
as diverse as CB radios, barbecues, children's toys, rocking 
chairs, vacuums, oil lamps, and even an old automatic coal feeder 
called a stokermatic. Trial Transcript, 176-216, 250-76. Her 
opinion as to cost or even value of these items, standing alone, 
does not suffice to prove value.9 The trial court's findings in 
this regard were clearly erroneous. The judgment should 
therefore be reversed. 
Request for Hearing and Fully Reasoned Decision 
Given the factual complexity and legal significance of this 
case as well as the age of certain precedents and the relative 
sparsity of case law, Appellants request oral argument and a 
fully reasoned opinion in this matter. 
Conclusion 
9. Plaintiff relies on a series of contract cases to 
establish the proposition that once the fact of damage is proven, 
the amount of damage may be proven somewhat less stringently. 
She claims that arithmetical precision is not required. 
Appellee's Brief 17. While Appellants do not necessarily concede 
that these cases state the law applicable to this case, even 
accepting their principles as correct avails the Plaintiff 
nothing. The point of this portion of the appeal is not that 
Plaintiff's damages are a little fuzzy or imprecise, it is that 
there is no competent evidence from which one can deduce the 
amount of damages without simply accepting pure guesswork and 
speculation in lieu of proper proof. 
21 
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of causation or 
intent and purpose to inflict harm on her claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court failed to make 
any findings relating to these matters. The judgment cannot 
therefore be sustained and ought to be reversed. Plaintiff 
failed to make any demand for property she believed to be hers 
prior to initiating this action, which was a prerequisite to 
suit. Finally, Plaintiff has presented no competent evidence 
sufficient to sustain her judgment for conversion. Accordingly, 
the judgment should be reversed in its entirety. 
DATED thisJ^f day of April, 1998. 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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